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The rise of social media platforms has simplified individuals’ ability to form 
deep connections and maintain better communication with members of their 
communities as well as with loved ones, friends, work colleagues, and others 
across the globe. While social media has many positive impacts in society, the 
trend of increasing digitalization across the globe also arguably gives rise to 
many unanticipated, destructive externalities. These negative externalities range 
from the improper use of user data by corporate entities to the exploitation of the 
powerful reach of social media by terrorist organizations.1 
Member states of the United Nations (U.N.) have taken some steps to counter 
the harmful byproducts of the social media revolution, such as the Tech Against 
Terrorism initiative, which “promote[s] constructive working relationships be-
tween the tech and government sectors” to “tackle terrorist use of the internet 
whilst respecting human rights.”2 While the U.N. has taken steps to address many 
of the negative side effects of social media, there are ongoing concerns regarding 
how the international community can address the economic incentives of social 
media corporations and the unique nature of social media platforms that encour-
age exploitation of users.3 One inherent difficulty in promoting international 
standards for social media corporations and platforms is that government actors 
arguably have a strong incentive to utilize user data collected by social media 
platforms as a means of monitoring and manipulating public opinion. This gov-
ernment incentive makes it difficult for the international community to reach a 
consensus on standards that states will hold themselves to when interacting with 
social media corporations and user data. 
Some bodies have formulated concrete protections of individual rights and 
user data, such as the European Union’s privacy law from 2016, the General Data 
Protection Regulation.4 However, these developments have not been echoed 
worldwide, and many communities likely still face exploitation of their data by 
corporate and government actors. Questions remain as to how the international 
community can address the exploitation of social media platforms by 
 
 1 Alex Voloshin, Social Media Corporations: International Law and the Regulation of 
Social Media Abuse, SEMINAR ON CORP. & INT’L L. (May 9, 2018). 
 2 About Tech Against Terrorism, TECH AGAINST TERRORISM, https://www.techagainstter-
rorism.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2020). 
 3 Social Media’s Moral Reckoning: Changing the Terms of Engagement with Silicon Val-
ley, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 21, 2018, 6:01 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12/21/so-
cial-medias-moral-reckoning. 
 4 Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1. 
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government actors and how domestic actors can pressure foreign states and in-
ternational corporations to comply with international law. 
Some of the most egregious abuses and manipulation of user data have oc-
curred in China, where the Chinese State enacted a repressive surveillance re-
gime in the Xinjiang province over its Uyghur Muslim population in the name 
of national security.5 Examinations of the Chinese regime in Xinjiang reveal that 
the State is facilitating “segregated surveillance,” where security personnel force 
the Uyghur Muslim population to “submit to monitoring and data collection 
while generally ignoring the majority Han Chinese, who make up 36 percent of 
Xinjiang’s population.”6 The Chinese government procures surveillance equip-
ment to use in Xinjiang from large state-owned enterprises such as the China 
Electronics Technology Corporation and Chinese multinational tech firms such 
as Hikvision and Huawei.7 The Chinese State has placed potentially “as many as 
1.5 million Uyghurs and members of other Muslim minorities” into “re-educa-
tion and detention centers,” which are used to promote loyalty to the Communist 
Party.8 
This note seeks to examine the various international legal mechanisms and 
regimes that could support a finding of corporate liability in situations where tech 
companies have played a large role in government abuses of human rights and 
examines potential alternatives at the regional and transnational levels. First, this 
note will closely examine the ongoing Chinese surveillance regime in the Xin-
jiang province and international responses to the Chinese corporate actors’ con-
duct. This first section also discusses China’s political strength on the interna-
tional stage and the state’s perception of and attitude towards its international 
legal obligations. Second, this note will explore the relative lack of relevant ap-
plicable international law and regulations to this issue, which is the product of 
both rapid technological development and political incentives for states to exploit 
and manipulate user data. Third, this note will examine international responses 
to the challenges of the social media and technological revolution on the regional 
level, as well as states’ domestic policies aimed at ensuring corporate responsi-
bility for human rights violations and protection of user data. 
Lastly, this note will argue that existing international legal mechanisms are 
insufficient to protect user data and prevent human rights abuses facilitated by 
exploiting digital channels. Existing international criminal legal regimes cannot 
realistically hold many corporate actors liable for their international crimes, 
 
 5 Chris Buckley & Paul Mozur, How China Uses High-Tech Surveillance to Subdue Mi-
norities, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/world/asia/china-
surveillance-xinjiang.html. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Nick Cumming-Bruce, U.S. Steps Up Criticism of China for Detentions in Xinjiang, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/13/world/asia/china-muslim-
xinjiang.html?module=inline. 
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much less those who state actors shield. Given China’s role on the U.N. Security 
Council and its overall influence in East Asia and worldwide, this paper argues 
that existing international law and international legal mechanisms fail to effec-
tively hold Chinese corporate actors accountable for their human rights abuses 
in the Xinjiang province. 
Instead, individual states must work with corporate actors, such as executives 
in tech firms and the social media industry, to promote responsible handling of 
user data. Furthermore, individual states must develop comprehensive transna-
tional sanction regimes that target those international corporate entities that fa-
cilitate human rights abuses. This push for widespread initiatives on the domestic 
level could realistically form customary international legal obligations and 




A. Internet Regulation, Digital Surveillance, and Human Rights Violations 
in China 
 
i.  Internet Regulation by the Chinese State 
 
The Chinese State’s expansive regime of internet regulation has received in-
creasingly heavy criticism by nations and other international actors in recent 
years. Freedom House, an independent watchdog organization that “amplif[ies] 
the voices of those struggling for freedom in repressive societies and counter 
authoritarian efforts to weaken international scrutiny,”9 declared China “the 
world’s worst abuser of internet freedom” in its 2019 Freedom on the Net report, 
The Crisis of Social Media.10 China has implemented a number of domestic laws 
and policies that not only heavily restrict the ability of domestic and foreign cor-
porations to conduct work within the State, but also require companies to ex-
pressly support the Chinese government in its repression of civil rights and 
 
 9 About Us, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/about-us (last visited Mar. 24, 
2021). 
 10 Adrian Shahbaz & Allie Funk, Freedom on the Net 2019: The Crisis of Social Media, 
FREEDOM HOUSE, https://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2019/crisis-social-me-
dia (last visited Apr. 5, 2021). 
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political dissident within the State.11 As “[t]he community of Chinese Internet 
users continues to grow,” the Chinese State has “simultaneously increase[d] its 
capacity to restrict content that might threaten social stability or state control.”12 
China’s sophisticated internet censorship regime is known informally as the 
“Great Firewall,” largely due to its automated blocking of many websites and 
services based outside China.13 This regime largely targets those that criticize the 
leadership or policies of the Chinese Communist Party.14 Both domestic and in-
ternational companies also face pressure to support the Chinese government’s 
stance on disputed terms and policies, such as territorial claims.15 Chinese au-
thorities use both publicly announced rules as introduced by regulatory bodies 
and special measures that are “aimed at creating a stable online environment dur-
ing a major [political] event” to tighten internet regulation when the Chinese 
State feels the potential for political instability.16 
International companies based outside of China face intense pressure to com-
ply with the Chinese government’s policies or risk complete censorship of their 
platforms and technology within China. The Chinese State has blocked internet 
access to many international news outlets, especially those that host Chinese-
language websites.17 Most international social media platforms are completely 
blocked in China, which has corresponded with exponential growth of Chinese 
platforms such as Tencent’s WeChat.18 Other international internet platforms, 
such as Google, have worked to develop platforms that comply with China’s 
expansive censorship requirements.19 Apple and Microsoft, both of which censor 
 
 11 See Alexandra Stevenson, China’s Communists Rewrite the Rules for Foreign Busi-
nesses, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/business/china-
communist-party-foreign-businesses.html. 
 12 China, OPENNET INITIATIVE, http://access.opennet.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/ac-
cesscontested-china.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2021) 
 13 Freedom on the Net 2019: China, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/coun-
try/china/freedom-net/2019 (last visited Apr. 5, 2021) [hereinafter Freedom on the Net 2019: 
China]. 
 14 See Adrian Shahbaz & Allie Funk, Freedom on the Net 2020: The Pandemic’s Digital 
Shadow, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2020/pandemics-
digital-shadow (last visited Apr. 5, 2021). 
 15 China: Events of 2018, HUM. RTS. WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/world-re-
port/2019/country-chapters/china-and-tibet#eaa21f (last visited Apr. 6, 2021) (“In January 
[2018], US-based Marriott International apologized for listing Taiwan and Tibet as separate 
countries on its website after authorities shut down the website and app in China for a week.”). 
 16 Cheang Ming & Saheli Roy Choudhury, China Has Launched Another Crackdown on 
the Internet – but It’s Different This Time, CNBC (Oct. 26, 2017, 8:06 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/26/china-internet-censorship-new-crackdowns-and-rules-
are-here-to-stay.html. 
 17 Freedom on the Net 2019: China, supra note 13. 
 18 Id. 
 19 China: Events of 2018, supra note 15 (“Google, which suspended its search service in 
China in 2010 citing censorship concerns, had been developing a censored search engine app 
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certain conduct on their Chinese networks, have faced criticism from lawmakers 
in the United States and from international groups for “helping to suppress rights 
they declare as essential in their home markets.”20 Both Apple and Microsoft 
have justified their participation in the Chinese market as helping promote op-
portunity and civil rights for the Chinese populace, but critics instead view this 
compliance as making it “easier for the authorities to convince other foreign 
companies to do the same.”21 Apple and Facebook additionally removed apps 
and developed unique software to respectively conform with the Chinese State’s 
policies in 2016.22 Critics argue that China’s internet policies, specifically those 
enforced against foreign companies, represent a blatant violation of China’s 
commitment “to a broad liberalization of trade in services, including data pro-
cessing and telecommunications” that the State took on when it joined the World 
Trade Organization in 2001.23 
The Chinese government’s intensive internet regulations have resulted in a 
growth of Chinese companies, many owned or at least partially controlled by the 
State, that must comply with these restrictive rules and promote the Chinese gov-
ernment’s policies.24 Locally hosted websites in China must “proactively moni-
tor content on their platforms and remove banned material from their platforms” 
or “may face severe punishment for failure to comply.”25 In August of 2013, the 
Chinese government issued a set of regulations called the “seven baselines,” 
which forced Chinese companies to immediately shut down more than 100,000 
accounts on their websites that did not comply with these rules.26 Sina Weibo, a 
Chinese blogging platform similar to Twitter, experienced a seventy percent drop 
in the number of posts on its platform between 2011 and 2013.27 
The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) oversees the telecommuni-
cations sector and regulates internet content.28 The CAC reports in turn to the 
 
for the Chinese market. The app would reportedly comply with China’s expansive censorship 
requirements by automatically identifying and filtering sites blocked by the Great Firewall, 
China’s internet filtering system.”). 
 20 Tom Simonite, US Companies Help Censor the Internet in China, Too, WIRED (June 3, 
2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/us-companies-help-censor-internet-china/. 
 21 Id. (quoting Charlie Smith, cofounder of Greatfire.org, which monitors Chinese censor-
ship). 
 22 Freedom on the Net 2017: China, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/coun-
try/china/freedom-net/2017 (last visited Apr. 6, 2021). 
 23 See, e.g., Tim Wu, China’s Online Censorship Stifles Trade, Too, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/04/opinion/china-censorship-internet.html. 
 24 Freedom on the Net 2019: China, supra note 13. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Elizabeth C. Economy, The Great Firewall of China: Xi Jinping’s Internet Shutdown, 
GUARDIAN (June 29, 2018, 1:00 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jun/29/the-
great-firewall-of-china-xi-jinpings-internet-shutdown (reporting that one Chinese company 
“shut down or ‘handled’ 100,000 Weibo accounts found to not comply with the new rules”). 
 27 Id. (referring to a study of 1.6 million Weibo users). 
 28 Freedom on the Net 2019: China, supra note 13. 
648 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. [Vol. 49:641 
Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission, which is headed directly by Xi 
Jinping,29 creating a direct line of communication from China’s leader to internet 
regulators. The Chinese Communist Party also uses its Central Propaganda De-
partment to oversee ideological trends in online content.30 Under this regime, 
censorship decisions often “are arbitrary and inconsistent, largely because of the 
amount of individuals and processes involved.”31 In June 2016, the CAC released 
a “mobile internet apps information service regulation,” which requires compa-
nies that offer digital apps to manage content produced and posted by users.32 
There are numerous examples of recently passed regulations by the Chinese 
State that have further restricted the ability for businesses to host and produce 
internet content in China. China’s Cybersecurity Law (CSL), which took effect 
in 2017, imposed a myriad of guidelines and restrictions for Chinese and multi-
national companies engaged in internet business in China.33 These include in-
creased requirements to censor, mandated data localization, real-name registra-
tion rules, and the obligation to assist security agencies with investigations.34 
Additionally, the law requires that foreign companies store Chinese user data in 
mainland China.35 In response to the heavy censorship requirements, companies 
such as Beyondsoft have begun offering censorship services for other Chinese 
platforms in order to ensure that these clients comply with Chinese domestic 
laws.36 Other companies, such as Sina Weibo and China’s top news app, Jinri 
Toutiao, have hired thousands of in-house content reviewers within the last few 
years to comply with increasing pressure from the Chinese government.37 Fur-
thermore, China issued regulations in May 2017 banning the publishing of online 
news or information services by sites not licensed by the Chinese government.38 
Under the CSL, businesses engaged in internet activities face a variety of mone-
tary penalties and even detention for failing to comply with the various require-
ments of the law.39 
 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Freedom on the Net 2017: China, supra note 22. 
 33 Freedom on the Net 2019: China, supra note 13. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Freedom on the Net 2017: China, supra note 22. 
 36 Li Yuan, Learning China’s Forbidden History, So They Can Censor It, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/02/business/china-internet-censor.html 
(“Beyond-soft employs over 4,000 workers . . . at its content reviewing factories. That is up 
from about 200 in 2016.”). 
 37 Freedom on the Net 2019: China, supra note 13. 
 38 Freedom on the Net 2017: China, supra note 22. 
 39 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wangluo Anquan Fa (中华人民共和国网络安全法) 
[Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 7, 2016, effective June 1, 2017), art. 59–70, 2016 STANDING 
COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. 
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Most relevant to this Note, however, are the Chinese internet laws that inordi-
nately impact activists, minority groups, and other individuals that the Chinese 
government deems dissident. The CAC and other Chinese governmental bodies 
have routinely introduced new rules and guidelines that increasingly restrict user-
generated content.40 Human rights activists and their families have been sub-
jected to targeted network disconnections during times of domestic turmoil.41 
Article 12 of the CSL dictates that individuals “must not use the Internet to en-
gage in activities endangering national security, national honor, and national in-
terests.”42 Article 58 of the CSL allows the CAC “to take temporary measures 
regarding network communications in a specially designated region” when a 
“need to protect national security and the social public order” exists or when a 
“major security incident[]” occurs.43 Furthermore, Article 24 mandates that “net-
work operators,” or those companies and actors who engage in internet business, 
require users to provide their real identity in order to use that service.44 User data 
from social media accounts and other platforms are processed by the “Police 
Cloud” system used by the Chinese government to track and predict the activities 
of human rights activists, ethnic minorities, and political dissidents.45 When Chi-
nese authorities conduct investigations based on some communication or content 
perceived to be harmful to the interests of the Chinese State, these authorities 
have the power to punish users for even private conversations between a small 
number of people.46 
Many of the Chinese companies that directly engage in production of surveil-
lance tools for the Chinese State have received international criticism for their 
role in the suppression of minority and dissident groups in China, with states 
 
 40 See Freedom on the Net 2019: China, supra note 13. 
 41 Id. (“Ding Zilin, one of the founders of Tiananmen Mothers, a group of activists who 
lost loved ones during the Tiananmen Square protests, was closely monitored in the weeks 
leading up to the June 4 anniversary in 2019, and her mobile phone connection was reportedly 
cut off.”). 
 42 Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 12. 
 43 Id. art. 58 (allowing the government to “limit[]” network communications that threaten 
national security or the social public order). 
 44 Id. art. 24 (“Network operators . . . shall require users to provide real identity infor-
mation when signing agreements with users or confirming the provision of services. Where 
users do not provide real identity information, network operators must not provide them with 
relevant services.”). 
 45 China: Police ‘Big Data’ Systems Violate Privacy, Target Dissent, HUM. RTS. WATCH 
(Nov. 19, 2017, 7:50 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/19/china-police-big-data-sys-
tems-violate-privacy-target-dissent#. 
 46 See Freedom on the Net 2019: China, supra note 13 (“In April 2018, . . . [police were 
instructed to] investigate an individual who had criticized Xi Jinping in a WeChat group with 
only eight members. Though the individual had used a pseudonym, the instructions identified 
him with his real name, address, and phone number.”). 
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such as the United States putting Chinese companies on “trading blacklists.”47 
Despite this international pressure, the sheer size of China’s population, in com-
bination with the government’s restrictions on foreign businesses and content, 
have helped cultivate the domestic Chinese tech industry. This domestic industry 
is heavily influenced and controlled by the Chinese State, and the government 
arguably utilizes this power dynamic to promote political stability and the Com-
munist Party’s interests. 
 
ii. The Role of Social Media and Digital Surveillance in the Persecution 
of the Uyghur People in the Xinjiang Region of China 
 
Since early 2017, Chinese authorities have detained at least 800,000 and pos-
sibly more than two million Uyghurs and members of other Muslim minorities 
in internment camps.48 This policy of detainment continues the pattern of human 
rights abuses against these communities by the Chinese State in the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region.49 As a part of this pattern of acts against the Uy-
ghur population, the Chinese State has required that social media platforms such 
as the Chinese platform WeChat allow the government to monitor the activity of 
its users.50 WeChat now actively requires users to provide voice samples and 
facial scans in order to use the platform.51 Government officials have targeted 
some users for their communication via WeChat with relatives living abroad.52 
Other companies, such as Chinese artificial intelligence giant iFlytek, have sup-
plied technology to officers of the Chinese State that is utilized to heavily moni-
tor the Uyghur populace.53 The government has also forced residents of the Xin-
jiang province to download an app, JingWang, that scans devices for particular 
 
 47 Isobel Asher Hamilton, The US Blacklisted Some of China’s Most Valuable AI Startups 
over Human Rights Issues in a Dramatic Trade War Escalation, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 8, 2019, 
5:49 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/us-blacklists-china-ai-startups-2019-10. 
 48 Megan Keller, State Dept. Official: China Holding 800k Muslim Minorities in Intern-
ment Camps, HILL (Dec. 5, 2018, 12:09 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/administra-
tion/419855-state-dept-official-china-holding-800k-uighurs-others-in-internment. 
 49 The China Challenge: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on E. Asia, the Pac., & Int’l Cy-
bersecurity Pol’y of the S. Comm. on Foreign Rels., 115th Cong. 85–91 (2018) (statement of 
Scott Busby, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Hum. Rts. & Lab., U.S. Dep’t of State). 
 50 Isobel Cockerell, Inside China’s Massive Surveillance Operation, WIRED (May 9, 2019, 
7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/inside-chinas-massive-surveillance-operation/. 
 51 See Stephen McDonell, China Social Media: WeChat and the Surveillance State, BBC 
NEWS (June 7, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-china-blog-48552907. 
 52 See Freedom on the Net 2019: China, supra note 13. 
 53 Isobel Cockerell, supra note 50. 
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files and collects data from users.54 This program is designed to search for files 
that match content blacklisted by the Chinese State.55 The Chinese government 
also has the power to disable popular social media apps in Xinjiang and does so 
in order to “clean” religious content and other material deemed extremist by the 
State.56 It further detained Muslim residents of Xinjiang for privately celebrating 
the independence of Kazakhstan from the Soviet Union.57 While the Chinese 
government has denied the existence of these camps, observers have cited public 
projects and expenditures by the Chinese government in the Xinjiang region as 
well as steady development of China’s “re-education” systems in the region as 
clear evidence supporting their existence.58 
States and organizations have begun responding to the Chinese State’s repres-
sive tactics in Xinjiang with sanctions against those Chinese security and sur-
veillance firms that aid the State in committing human rights abuses. In October 
of 2019, the U.S. government decided to blacklist top Chinese-based surveillance 
companies in response to reports of the ongoing human rights abuses in Xin-
jiang.59 However, these sanctions constitute export controls on U.S. origin goods, 
instead of the more onerous Magnitsky sanctions that the U.S. government can 
impose on foreign actors for human rights abuses.60 The United States had pre-
viously banned U.S. technology companies from selling products to Huawei, the 
 
 54 Joseph Cox, Chinese Government Forces Residents to Install Surveillance App with 
Awful Security, VICE (Apr. 9, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/arti-
cle/ne94dg/jingwang-app-no-encryption-china-force-install-urumqi-xinjiang. 
 55 Freedom on the Net 2019: China, supra note 13. 
 56 See, e.g., Wenxin Fan, China Appears to Block Social-Media Platform Clubhouse After 
Brief Flourishing of Debate, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 8, 2021, 11:51 PM), https://www.wsj.com/ar-
ticles/china-appears-to-block-social-media-platform-clubhouse-after-brief-flourishing-of-de-
bate-11612810286 (“Beijing’s censors appeared to slam the door on Clubhouse, Silicon Val-
ley’s latest social-media hit, after a frenzied week in which the audio-only chat app helped 
spark a rare outpouring of freewheeling debate on taboo topics in the Chinese-speaking 
world.”). 
 57 Freedom on the Net 2018: China, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/re-
port/freedom-net/2018/china (last visited Apr. 7, 2021) (“In December 2017, around 40 ethnic 
Kazakhs were arrested for disseminating content in WeChat groups that celebrated the inde-
pendence of Republic of Kazakhstan from the Soviet Union.”). 
 58 Adrian Zenz, New Evidence for China’s Political Re-education Campaign in Xinjiang, 
JAMESTOWN FOUND. (May 15, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://jamestown.org/program/evidence-for-
chinas-political-re-education-campaign-in-xinjiang/ (“This article demonstrates that there is, 
in fact, a substantial body of PRC governmental sources that prove the existence of the camps. 
Furthermore, the PRC government’s own sources broadly corroborate some estimates by 
rights groups of number of individuals interred in the camps.”). 
 59 Charles Rollet, Xinjiang Backlash Is Hitting Chinese Firms Hard, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 
18, 2019, 11:58 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/18/xinjiang-sanctions-chinese-
firms-surveillance/ (“The entities affected include the world’s two largest security camera 
manufacturers and three multibillion-dollar facial recognition start-ups.”). 
 60 Id. (explaining that Magnitsky sanctions “would ban all transactions between covered 
entities and the United States”). 
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Chinese telecommunication giant, but in 2019 the United States began issuing 
licenses to some firms to allow them to sell to the Chinese company.61 
In June of 2020, the United States passed the Uyghur Human Rights Policy 
Act of 2020, which requires various U.S. government bodies to report human 
rights abuses by the Chinese government against the Uyghur population in Xin-
jiang.62 In this Act, the United States specifically cited the policies and detentions 
in Xinjiang as violating China’s international human rights law obligations under 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrim-
ination, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.63 Politicians in the United 
Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands are also raising concerns about Chinese 
firms that either produce products for the European market or design intensive 
security apparatuses for the Chinese State authorities.64 
While U.S. sanctions have had some effect on the market performance of Chi-
nese firms that assist in human rights abuse, some U.S. politicians have argued 
that forming multilateral sanction regimes with partners such as the EU would 
more effectively deter such conduct by these Chinese companies and influence 
the conduct of the Chinese State by association.65 Although the EU has decried 
China for some of its human rights abuses, it has received criticism for not more 
firmly pressing China on the human rights violations in Xinjiang during the 2019 
EU-China Summit.66 
China’s influence on the global stage, extensive financial capital, and increas-
ing domestic technology sector have arguably hampered the efforts of individual 
states and the international community at large to hold Chinese corporations and 
their controlling governmental actors liable for human rights violations in Xin-
jiang. Both the Council on Foreign Relations and Freedom House, two major 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that focus on international issues, have 
cited a report by the New York Times that China has exported its artificial 
 
 61 Sherisse Pham, Huawei Will Soon Be Able to Buy from Some U.S. Suppliers Again, 
CNN BUS. (Nov. 22, 2019, 2:21 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/21/tech/huawei-us-li-
censes/index.html. 
 62 Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116–145, § 1, 134 Stat. 648, 
652. 
 63 Id. § 3(2)–(3). 
 64 Rollet, supra note 59. 
 65 Id. (“If U.S. allies like the European Union were to join such a new trade regime, the 
potential to affect China’s actual domestic policies would be much greater than by blacklisting 
a few surveillance companies.”). 
 66 Keegan Elmer, EU Calls Out Beijing on Human Rights but Activists Want Harder Line 
Against China’s Xinjiang and Tibet Policy, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 10, 2019, 2:30 
PM), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3005510/eu-calls-out-china-hu-
man-rights-stops-short-pressing-beijing (“European Council President Donald Tusk said the 
union raised human rights with China, but he did not say which issues were brought up.”). 
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intelligence and surveillance technology to various States in South America and 
Africa.67 The widespread use of these advanced surveillance systems promotes 
the type of monitoring that the Chinese State has used on its population and could 
arguably increase the chance of serious human rights violations against the pop-
ulation by the State and its powerful corporate allies. 
The Chinese State has hired private companies and groups to create virtual 
accounts, including bot accounts, on social media sites such as Twitter to spread 
disinformation and to amplify messages beneficial to the interests of the Chinese 
Community Party.68 The Chinese State has continually pushed for an increased 
presence of Communist Party members within the leadership of Chinese private 
firms, leading to increased alignment of these firms’ objectives and policies with 
those of the State.69 In 2016, China’s leader, Xi Jinping, instructed the top official 
media organizations in China to modify their platforms and narratives to increase 
global influence.70 These concerted efforts to spread Chinese State propaganda 
and technology, combined with China’s position on the U.N. Security Council 
and overall influence on the global stage, have made it difficult for the interna-
tional community to hold Chinese corporations liable for their complicity and 
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B. The Development of International and Transnational Regulations of the 
Internet and Corporate Conduct Regarding Data Privacy 
 
i. Internet Governance, Data Surveillance, and Corporate Conduct as 
Addressed by the United Nations, the International Court of 
Justice, and the International Criminal Court 
 
While there are sparse examples of major international regulations or customs 
regarding data privacy and corporate liability in the social media context, the 
U.N. has adopted major initiatives and resolutions regarding data privacy and the 
use of the internet in general. Given the rapid development of the online sector 
in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, the U.N. did not take concrete steps to 
address international legal issues inherent in internet use until the 2000s. In 2001, 
the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution endorsing a World Summit on 
the Information Society (WSIS) in two sessions in 2003 and 2005.72 This reso-
lution encouraged all state governments, international organizations, non-gov-
ernmental organizations, and private sector actors to participate in the prepara-
tory process of the WSIS and to participate at the Summit itself.73 The 2005 
WSIS was held in Tunis, and the agenda asked the U.N. Secretary-General to 
convene the first Internet Governance Forum (IGF) in 2006, which mandated 
discussion of public policy concerns and emerging issues related to internet gov-
ernance.74 
In 2015, the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution that extended the ex-
isting mandate of the IGF for ten years75 and reaffirmed that “the same rights that 
people have offline must also be protected online.”76 The Resolution called upon 
all Member States to review their policies “regarding the surveillance of com-
munications . . . including mass surveillance, with a view to upholding the right 
to privacy as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights for States that are party to the 
Covenant.”77 The Resolution more broadly called on Member States to “ensur[e] 
the full and effective implementation of all [States’] obligations under interna-
tional human rights law.”78 Most relevant to this Note, the 2015 Resolution called 
 
 72 G.A. Res. 56/183, ¶ 1 (Dec. 21, 2001). 
 73 Id. ¶¶ 4–5. 
 74 World Summit on the Info. Soc’y [WSIS], Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, ¶ 
72, WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev. 1)-E (Nov. 18, 2005). 
 75 G.A. Res. A.70/125, ¶ 63 (Dec. 16, 2015). 
 76 Id. ¶ 43. 
 77 Id. ¶ 46. 
 78 Id. 
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upon Member States to cooperate with one another on “transnational issues of 
information and communications technologies and the use thereof, including ca-
pacity-building and cooperation in combating the criminal misuse of the tech-
nologies and preventing the use of technology, communications and resources 
for criminal or terrorist purposes.”79 
While the IFG presents a useful forum for state and non-state actors to meet 
and discuss current and anticipated public policy issues related to internet gov-
ernance, systemic issues inherent in existing international legal regimes have ar-
guably made it difficult for states to hold corporate actors accountable for their 
conduct violating international human rights law (IHRL). One major roadblock 
to ensuring corporate compliance with the principles of IHRL is that corporate 
entities do not face international criminal liability under the Rome Statute, which 
only grants the International Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction over “natural per-
sons.”80 While superiors may be held criminally responsible for acts committed 
by subordinates under the Rome Statute,81 the option to authorize the ICC to 
pursue criminal charges directly against corporate entities as juridical persons 
was rejected during the U.N. talks leading up to the signing of the Rome Statute 
in July of 1998.82 
Traditionally, States are the primary actors and subjects under international 
law, while far fewer guiding treaties and customary international legal rules cre-
ate individual private liability for breaches of international law.83 In a 1949 Ad-
visory Opinion, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) explained that while a 
non-state actor may be “an international person” and thus may be “a subject of 
international law and capable of possessing international rights and duties,” this 
does not mean that the non-state actor’s “legal personality and rights and duties 
are the same as those of a State.”84 While not a binding decision on state actors, 
this Advisory Opinion supports the theory that while a non-state organizational 
actor may have international legal rights and duties as a result of its “capacity to 
operate upon an international plane.”85 However, it does not necessarily follow 
that the international legal rules which apply to state actors, specifically those 
based in custom and general practice, apply equally to non-state actors. 
 
 79 Id. ¶ 53. 
 80 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90. 
 81 Id. at art. 28. 
 82 David Scheffer, Corporate Liability Under the Rome Statute, 57 HARV. INT’L L. J. 35, 
38 (2016). At least one scholar has pointed to the “insufficient number of national jurisdictions 
that held corporations liable under criminal law, as opposed to civil tort liability” as a reason 
for the rejection. Id. 
 83 States in International Law, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/interna-
tional-law/States-in-international-law (last visited Oct. 8, 2020). 
 84 Reparation of Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 
1949 I.C.J. 174, 179 (Apr. 11). 
 85 Id. 
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In 2011, a Special Representative to the Secretary General developed the U.N. 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which was unanimously en-
dorsed by the U.N. Human Rights Council in June of 2011.86 The Human Rights 
Council also established an Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group to 
draft a legally binding treaty on business activities by transnational corporations 
and human rights.87 This draft treaty specifically invokes the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights and “the nine core International Human Rights Instru-
ments” adopted by the U.N., 88 and defines “[h]uman rights violation or abuse” 
as “any harm committed by a State or a business enterprise . . . against . . . any 
persons or group of persons . . . including physical or mental injury, emotional 
suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their human rights, includ-
ing environmental rights.”89 Despite the legal considerations pushing for inter-
national legal personality attaching to non-state actors, actual application in in-
ternational legal frameworks lags due to policy concerns.90 
 
ii. Internet Governance, Data Surveillance, and Corporate Conduct as 
Addressed by Regional Organizations 
 
While the development of comprehensive regulations pertaining to utilization 
of user data and corporate accountability at the global level remains difficult 
given clashing interests among the U.N.’s members, practical considerations 
may indicate that regional and domestic regulatory regimes are better equipped 
to address these issues. For instance, states who share borders and occupy distinct 
regions of the world may share common policy interests tied to that region. Fur-
thermore, the development of similar transnational policies and laws by multiple 
 
 86 OHCHR and Business and Human Rights, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMM’R, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/BusinessIndex.aspx (last visited Mar. 28, 
2021). 
 87 Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations and 
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visited Mar. 28, 2021). 
 88 U.N. Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Grp., Legally Binding Instrument to 
Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations 
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states may facilitate multilateral agreements or even the emergence of customary 
international law over time. 
One regional organization that has arguably developed more effective legal 
mechanisms relating to internet governance, data use, and corporate liability is 
the EU. The European Dialogue on Internet Governance (EuroDIG), launched in 
2008 and supported by the executive branch of the EU, “fosters dialogue and 
collaboration with the Internet community on public policy for the Internet.”91 
The EuroDIG serves to “support the general objectives of the global Internet 
Governance Forum,” while also facilitating discussions aimed at “overcom[ing] 
digital divides in Europe.”92 EuroDIG membership “is open to any natural or 
legal person interested in supporting the purposes of EuroDIG,” and the powers 
of members within the EuroDIG organization depend on the timing of when they 
joined the Association.93 Such a structure incentivizes both state and non-state 
actors to continually engage in EuroDIG discussions to better voice their opin-
ions on certain policy issues and identify common ground.94 
The most comprehensive internet regulatory scheme by the EU and arguably 
by any international body, however, is the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR). Passed in April of 2016 by the European Parliament and Council of the 
EU, the GDPR aims to “ensure a consistent level of protection” for the privacy 
and data of “natural persons throughout the [EU],” as well as to “provide legal 
certainty and transparency for economic operators.”95 While the GDPR suggests 
that administrative fines should be imposed for infringement of the regulation’s 
provisions, it leaves “the rules on criminal penalties for infringements” of the 
GDPR to Member States.96 Furthermore, the GDPR does not apply to the pro-
cessing of personal data “by competent authorities for . . . the prevention of 
threats to public security.”97 Thus, should a state actor declare that a threat to 
public security exists and that circumstances require heavier monitoring of the 
population’s personal data, then the GDPR would arguably not apply. 
Despite these weaknesses—allowing state actors to conduct surveillance over 
individuals in certain situations and limiting criminal accountability for such 
conduct—the GDPR exerts extraterritorial reach in some situations.98 Specifi-
cally, it may apply to “a controller or processor not established in the Union” 
when that actor is processing “personal data of data subjects who are in the 
 
 91 About EuroDIG, EURODIG, https://www.eurodig.org/index.php?id=74 (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2021). 
 92 Statutes, EURODIG SUPPORT ASSOCIATION, § 2 (June 20, 2019), https://www.euro-
dig.org/about/who-we-are/#tab-eurodig-statutes. 
 93 Id. § 4. 
 94 About EuroDIG, supra note 91. 
 95 Council Regulation 2016/679, pmbl. ¶ 13, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 3. 
 96 Id. at pmbl. ¶¶ 148–49. 
 97 Id. at art. 2(2)(d). 
 98 Id. at art. 3. 
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Union,” albeit in limited circumstances.99 The GDPR says that both “control-
ler[s]”—those with “the purposes and means of processing personal data”—as 
well as a “processor[s]”—those who “process[] personal data on behalf of the 
controller”—include “natural or legal person[s],” as well as “public au-
thorit[ies].”100 
As of 2019, critics of the GDPR have noted that while the regulation has found 
“success as a breach notification law,” it has not been as effective “when it comes 
to imposing fines on companies that fail to adequately protect their customers’ 
data.”101 Additionally, three Member States of the EU have still not fully adapted 
their national legislation to implement the GDPR.102 At the national level, Mem-
ber States of the EU must “set up and allocate powers to the national data pro-
tection authorities, lay down rules on specific issues . . . and amend or repeal 
sectoral legislation with data protection aspects” to satisfy the GDPR.103 Despite 
the apparent burdens that the GDPR places on corporations who fall under its 
purview, the European Commission has argued that the GDPR actually “encour-
ages the development of new technologies while respecting the fundamental 
right to protection of personal data,” as businesses “have started developing . . . 
new, more privacy-friendly services” and “have promoted respect for personal 
data as a competitive differentiator and a selling point.”104 
Furthermore, a “growing number of companies” have “extend[ed] . . . the 
rights created by [GDPR] to their non-EU based customers” in response to in-
creasing concerns worldwide regarding internet security.105 In addition to the di-
rect reach of the GDPR, the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council has “intensified its engagement with third countries and other interna-
tional partners” in reaching agreements on internet privacy policies.106 One ex-
ample of these agreements, the “EU-Japan mutual adequacy arrangement” that 
 
 99 Id. at art. 3(2) (explaining that controllers or processors who are “not established in the 
Union” may be held under the standards of the GDPR when the processing activities of those 
entities are related to either the offering of goods or services or the monitoring of the behavior 
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 100 Id. at arts. 4(7)–(8). 
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lion euros during the first nine months that the GDPR was in effect, a single fifty million euro 
fine levied against Google in January of 2019 accounts for nearly 90% of that sum). 
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3, COM (2019) 374 final (July 24, 2019). 
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entered into force in February of 2019, “created the world’s largest area of free 
and safe data flows.”107 Member States of the EU have continued to develop 
similar “adequacy” measures with non-EU States across the globe and to adapt 
existing “adequacy decisions” with third countries to the newer GDPR frame-
work.108 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has also ruled on data privacy 
and the permissibility of surveillance regimes. In 1978, the ECHR ruled that un-
der the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms (CPHRFF), signed by members of the Council of Europe,109 “Contracting 
States [to the Convention] may not, in the name of the struggle against espionage 
and terrorism, adopt whatever measures they deem appropriate.”110 The ECHR 
stressed that despite the “certain discretion” that domestic legislatures have when 
creating surveillance systems, “this does not mean that the Contracting States 
enjoy an unlimited discretion to subject persons within their jurisdiction to secret 
surveillance.”111 In a 2016 ruling, the ECHR explained that the proliferation of 
digital surveillance tools raises “the question as to whether the development of 
surveillance methods resulting in masses of data collected has been accompanied 
by a simultaneous development of legal safeguards” that ensure the rights en-
shrined in the CPHRFF.112 Given these specific decisions by the ECHR, along 
with others made pursuant to claims under the CPHRFF, the CPHRFF appears 
to protect the data rights of citizens of Member States. 
One major regional organization in Eurasia, the Shanghai Cooperation Organ-
ization (SCO), arguably sacrificed the goals of user data protection and promo-
tion of human rights in favor of promoting political stability and national secu-
rity. China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan 
announced the SCO in 2001, signed the SCO Charter in June of 2002, and en-
tered the agreement into force in September of 2003.113 The SCO Charter ex-
pressly endorses “the strengthening of peace and ensuring of security and stabil-
ity in the region in the environment of developing political multipolarity and 
economic and information globalization.”114 In 2009, Member States of SCO 
signed their own Agreement regarding “International Information Security.” In 
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contrast to the GDPR, this Agreement focuses more heavily on “limiting the 
spread and use of information weapons threatening defense capacity, national 
security and public safety”115 than protecting personal user data. Under the 
Agreement, SCO Member States exchange “information, analysis and joint as-
sessment of emerging threats to information security, as well as identification, 
reconciliation and coordination of joint responses to these threats.”116 Further-
more, the Agreement mandates SCO Member States to carry out its provisions 
“consistent with universally recognized principles and norms of the international 
law, including . . . respect for human rights.”117 
Critics of the SCO highlighted “human rights concerns raised by SCO struc-
ture, policies, and practices,” namely those activities by the SCO carried out in 
the name of counterterrorism.118 The SCO’s “‘come as you are’ approach of non-
interference in internal affairs,” as well as its “prioritization of member state sta-
bility,” garnered it international appeal from states who face internal security 
threats.119 The SCO’s approach to counter-terrorism reflects China’s continual 
focus on fighting the “Three Evil Forces,” typically defined as “terrorism, ethnic 
separatism, and religious extremism.”120 The SCO’s focus has led to “crack-
downs and abuses related to individual exercise of fundamental rights and free-
doms” including “discrimination against and targeting of ethnic and other vul-
nerable groups.”121 
Despite the human rights concerns voiced against the SCO, the U.N. has 
“granted the SCO observer status and continues to pursue expanded cooperation” 
with the organization, which critics have warned may “contribute to the strength-
ening of a regional approach that is undermining international human rights.”122 
The EU remains more skeptical of the legitimacy of some of the SCO’s practices; 
one resolution from the European Parliament in 2014 recognized “the absence of 
any formal cooperation mechanism between the SCO and the EU,” as well as 
“divergences in [the EU’s and the SCO’s] respective normative bases and 
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outlooks on global issues.”123 A Briefing from the European Parliament Research 
Service (EPRS) noted that while the SCO Charter mandates “the protection of 
human rights as an obligation of individual member states under international 
law,” this voiced obligation “is clearly subordinated to the fight against sepa-
ratist, extremist and terrorist groups.”124 The Briefing further noted that the 
SCO’s focus on combatting these groups involves “the suppression of riots and 
uprisings, and even peaceful dissent,” by the individual member states of the 
SCO.125 
Outside observers have called the SCO’s stances on internet governance, data 
surveillance, and the protection of human rights into question. In examining the 
International Code of Conduct for Information Security proposal that the SCO 
submitted to the U.N. General Assembly in 2011 and 2015, one NGO argued that 
“[t]he SCO states may view the Code as a vehicle to redefine application of in-
ternational human rights law.”126 According to one critic, even after “taking into 
consideration” suggestions from the international community in 2011, the 2015 
Code of Conduct proposal “still raise[d] serious concerns with respect to human 
rights,” as the Code’s narrative “emphasize[d] state sovereignty and territoriality 
in the digital space above all else, and [wa]s dominated by intelligence, national 
security, and regime stability imperatives.”127 Another critic of the SCO believes 
that the SCO is forwarding a “proposed norm” under international law through 
its vision of data surveillance and internet governance under the proposed 
Code.128 They further believe that reactions to the acts of States such as Russia 
and China by actors such as the United States help perpetuate this “proposed 
norm” of territorial sovereignty in the digital space.129 In short, the internet gov-
ernance and data surveillance stances of the SCO and of its most influential mem-
ber states, namely China, reflect a view of international human rights law that 
opposes the pro-individual rights view held by the EU, ECHR, and Council. 
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iii. Internet Governance, Data Surveillance, and Corporate Conduct as 
Addressed by Transnational Laws and Policies 
 
Several States have domestic legislation that imposes sanctions on foreign in-
dividuals and entities that are involved in human rights abuses. The Global Mag-
nitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Magnitsky Act), one major piece of 
such legislation, was passed by the United States Congress in 2016.130 Under the 
Magnitsky Act as passed, foreign persons131 could be sanctioned for “gross vio-
lations of internationally recognized human rights” based on credible evi-
dence.132 Further, the U.S. President may sanction corporations for committing 
human rights violations themselves, as well as for “act[ing] as an agent of or on 
behalf of a foreign person” who commits these violations.133 In 2017, President 
Donald Trump modified the Magnitsky Act via executive order to broaden the 
scope of liability for foreign actors, namely changing the “gross” standard for 
violations to “serious.”134 Under the Magnitsky Act, the United States can bar 
foreign persons, both individuals and entities, from entering the country and can 
“block” transactions of property within the United States.135 
The European Parliament of the EU, taking count of the Magnitsky Act and 
similar “Magnitsky laws” that enable governments to impose targeted sanctions, 
passed a resolution urging adoption of similar standards for all its Member States, 
as well as at the EU level.136 In addition to providing deterrence for potential 
human rights abusers, some groups have noted that the Magnitsky Act and sim-
ilar transnational laws provide incentives to foreign governments to improve 
their own accountability.137 
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DOC. P8 TA(2019/0215) (2019). 
 137 See, e.g., The US Global Magnitsky Act: Questions and Answers, HUM. RTS. WATCH 
(Sept. 13, 2017, 10:40 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/13/us-global-magnitsky-act 
(“By cooperating with the US on Global Magnitsky investigations, foreign leaders can show 
that they will not tolerate human rights abusers in their own countries.”). 
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While laws such as the Magnitsky Act seem to offer a valid avenue for pursu-
ing claims against foreign corporations and actors for human rights abuses, the 
ability for domestic courts to hear individual claims against foreign corporations 
remains in question. In 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS), which allows U.S. district courts to hear civil claims by aliens for 
torts “committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States,”138 should not extend liability to foreign corporations.139 The U.S. Su-
preme Court had previously held that the ATS does not grant relief “for viola-
tions of the law of nations occurring outside the United States.”140 
In 2017, France passed a law that holds corporations liable under French law 
for human rights abuses committed by those companies, their subcontractors, and 
their suppliers.141 The law mandates that certain companies, depending on their 
size and their presence in France, implement an “effective vigilance plan.”142 
Penalties are imposed only in the instance that the corporation does not adopt 
“due diligence measures.”143 However, the penalty provision of the French law 
was struck down in March of 2017 by the French Constitutional Council due to 
vague language in the statute.144 While observers have noted that other portions 
of the Constitutional Council’s decision have deprived the French law of some 
of its “fundamental provisions,” they also note that the current version’s enforce-
ment mechanisms have allowed interested parties to request compensation under 
French common civil law.145 The domestic laws’ limitation of domestic courts 
represent an ongoing struggle to reconcile the vastly different foundations and 
principles between domestic and international bodies of law, as well as the ability 
for domestic courts to successfully adjudicate claims against foreign defendants. 
Many other States are currently developing laws that seek to ensure corporate 
accountability for human rights abuses in these contexts. In April of 2019, the 
United Kingdom announced the introduction of an independent regulator to 
 
 138 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (2019). 
 139 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S.Ct. 1386, 1403 (2018) (“[A]bsent further action from 
Congress it would be inappropriate for courts to extend ATS liability to foreign corpora-
tions.”). 
 140 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). 
 141 Loi 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des 
entreprises donneuses d’ordre [Law 2017-399 of March 27, 2017 Relating to the Duty of Care 
of Parent Companies and Contractors], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE 
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 23, 2017, p. 1–2. 
 142 Id. at p. 1. 
 143 Id. at p. 2. 
 144 Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2017-750DC, Mar. 
23, 2017, Rec. 13, ¶ 14 (Fr.). 
 145 Sandra Cossart, Opinion, What Lessons Does France’s Duty of Vigilance Law Have for 
Other National Initiatives?, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RES. CTR. (June 27, 2019), https://www.busi-
ness-humanrights.org/en/blog/what-lessons-does-frances-duty-of-vigilance-law-have-for-
other-national-initiatives/. 
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ensure that social media companies and tech firms “protect their users and face 
tough penalties if they do not comply.”146 Under the proposed rules, companies 
could face substantial fines and senior management individuals could face per-
sonal liability.147 Germany also passed its own “Network Enforcement Law” in 
2017, which holds social media companies that have at least two million users in 
Germany liable for fines up to fifty million euros if they fail to delete comments 
and posts deemed to violate German law.148 Both the German and British laws 
ensure harsh penalties for companies that violate domestic law, yet both appar-
ently lack extraterritorial reach and have faced criticism for their elements of 
censorship.149 Admittedly, domestic laws from various states do not perfectly 
ensure that foreign corporate entities can truly be held accountable for their com-
plicity in or active perpetration of human rights violations. Nonetheless, they can 
be deployed relatively quickly and are more targeted in scope than existing in-
















 146 Press Release, UK to Introduce World First Online Safety Laws (Apr. 8, 2019), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-to-introduce-world-first-online-safety-laws. 
 147 Matthew S. Schwartz, U.K. Regulators Propose Broad Social Media Regulations to 
Counter ‘Online Harms’, NPR (Apr. 8, 2019, 8:18 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/04/08/711091689/u-k-regulators-propose-broad-social-media-reg-
ulations-to-counter-online-harms. 
 148 Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, With Huge Fines, German Law Pushes Social Networks to 
Delete Abusive Posts, NPR (Oct. 31, 2017, 7:44 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/paral-
lels/2017/10/31/561024666/with-huge-fines-german-law-pushes-social-networks-to-delete-
abusive-posts. 
 149 Id. (“[C]ritics of the new law call it an assault on free speech that is more likely to 
increase censorship than to decrease fake news and hate speech.”). 
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III. ANALYSIS 
 
A. Existing International Law, Transnational Accountability Mechanisms, 
and the Human Rights Violations in Xinjiang 
 
i. China’s Ability to Prevent Meaningful Action by U.N. Bodies and 
Growing Soft Power Severely Hinder International Legal Action 
Against Chinese Corporations and the Chinese State on the 
Global Level for the Atrocities in Xinjiang 
 
China’s position on the U.N. Security Council, as well as its ideological and 
economic influence over authoritarian-leaning regimes worldwide,150 has made 
it difficult to develop a global consensus among states against the extensive hu-
man rights violations committed by the Chinese State and by corporations oper-
ating in the Xinjiang region. China and other nations on the U.N. Security Coun-
cil have not reached a consensus over the treatment of the Uyghur and other 
minority groups in Xinjiang, and some states have rejected forms of U.N. action 
in Xinjiang that could validate China’s justifications for the treatment of these 
minority groups.151 
Under the U.N. Charter, action by the Security Council requires affirmative 
votes of nine of the fifteen members, including all five of the permanent mem-
bers, for all non-procedural matters.152 The Security Council has the power to 
impose sanctions in order to “give effect to its decisions,”153 and through 2020 
had sanctioned nearly 300 entities.154 This has included sanctions against pri-
vately-owned companies who committed violations of Security Council 
 
 150 See Rule by Fear: 30 Years After Tiananmen Square: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Foreign Rels., 116th Cong. 4–8 (2019) (statement of Christopher Walker, Vice President, 
Studies & Analysis, National Endowment for Democracy). 
 151 U.S., Germany Slam China at U.N. Security Council over Xinjiang: Diplomats, 
REUTERS (July 2, 2019, 7:06 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-rights/us-ger-
many-slam-china-at-un-security-council-over-xinjiang-diplomats-idUSKCN1TX2YZ (“Last 
month the United States, Britain and other western countries objected to a visit by the United 
Nations counterterrorism chief to Xinjiang, concerned the visit would validate China’s argu-
ment that it was tackling terrorism.”). 
 152 U.N. Charter art. 27, ¶ 3. 
 153 Id. at art. 41. 
 154 The UN Security Council, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Sept. 16, 2020), 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/un-security-council. 
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resolutions.155 But given China’s position as a permanent member of the Security 
Council,156 it can veto any sort of non-procedural action that the Security Council 
could take to stop the ongoing human rights abuses in Xinjiang, which includes 
blocking any potential U.N. Security Council sanctions against violating Chinese 
companies. 
In any instance, while the U.N. Security Council holds the power to take action 
against threats to international peace and security,157 responsibility for the pro-
tection of equal rights and self-determination of the citizens of U.N. member 
States falls on the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council.158 
Although the Security Council “at times[] deals with grave human rights viola-
tions,” these investigations often are tied to “conflict areas.”159 Thus, even if the 
Security Council could recommend action against the Chinese State and Chinese 
corporations for the human rights abuses in Xinjiang, China may have a valid 
argument that the U.N. Security Council lacks the power to handle this sort of 
dispute. 
Within the U.N. General Assembly, there are competing views on the situation 
in Xinjiang and its legality under international law. In October of 2019, a faction 
of twenty-three countries raised concerns over the human rights abuses at the 
U.N. General Assembly and called upon China to uphold its international obli-
gations and to provide access to Xinjiang for international monitors.160 In re-
sponse, Belarus made a statement on behalf of fifty-four countries, voicing ap-
proval of China’s “counter-terrorism” program in Xinjiang.161 This represented 
an increase from the thirty-seven nations that supported China’s Xinjiang poli-
cies in July of 2019.162 
In its 2018 report on China, the U.N. Human Rights Council Working Group 
on the Universal Period Review called upon China to implement the recommen-
dations made by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 
 
 155 See, e.g., U.N. Sec. Council, Sanctions Against Butembo Airlines (BAL) (Mar. 29, 
2007) (sanctioning a “[p]rivately-owned airline” for providing assistance to illegal armed 
groups in violation of Security Council resolutions). 
 156 U.N. Charter art. 23, ¶ 1. 
 157 U.N. Charter art. 39. 
 158 U.N. Charter art. 60. 
 159 Protect Human Rights, U.N., https://www.un.org/en/sections/what-we-do/protect-hu-
man-rights/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2021). 
 160 Ben Westcott & Richard Roth, UN Members Issue Dueling Statements over China’s 
Treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, CNN (Oct. 29, 2019, 11:33 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/29/asia/china-xinjiang-united-nations-intl-hnk/index.html. 
 161 Id. (“‘The joint statement spoke positively of the results of counter-terrorism and de-
radicalization measures in Xinjiang and noted that these measures have effectively safe-
guarded the basic human rights of people of all ethnic groups,’ representatives for Belarus said 
in a press release.”). 
 162 Id. 
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August 2018 regarding Xinjiang.163 The report also noted China’s stance that the 
State “resolutely opposed and would never accept the practice of using human 
rights as an excuse to interfere in its internal affairs and undermine its sover-
eignty and territorial integrity.”164 Unsurprisingly, China declined to implement 
these recommendations and instead suggested that monitors and journalists could 
only enter Xinjiang in accordance with Chinese law, while affirming the State’s 
strong opposition to “interference in its sovereignty and internal affairs under 
any pretext.”165 
This conditioning of human rights on Chinese domestic security interests 
should draw condemnation from top U.N. officials given the principles of equal 
rights and self-determination espoused in Article 55 of the U.N. Charter.166 How-
ever, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has refrained from commenting 
on growing evidence of the abuses in Xinjiang and instead has supported China’s 
justifications for the surveillance and detention regime in Xinjiang.167 Within the 
U.N., China has used its membership on the Economic and Social Council’s 
NGO Committee to block U.N. accreditation for those NGOs critical of China.168 
China’s position on the Security Council, as well as its active role in the U.N. as 
the head of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs and the second-larg-
est funder of the U.N. regular budget,169 have weakened the efforts of those U.N. 
Member States who oppose the ongoing human rights violations in Xinjiang. As 
China continues to find support from other autocratic regimes worldwide, 
 
 163 Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review of 
China in its Thirty-First Session, ¶ 28.23, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/40/6 (2018) (France calling on 
China to “[i]mplement all of the recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination of August 2018 regarding Xinjiang, particularly on putting an end to 
mass internments in camps, and invite the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights and special procedure experts”). 
 164 Id. ¶ 27. 
 165 Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review of 
China in its Thirty-First Session Addendum, ¶ 28.22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/40/6/Add.1 (2018). 
 166 See U.N. Charter art. 55(c) (requiring promotion of “universal respect for, and ob-
servance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion”). 
 167 Daily Press Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesman for the Secretary-General, Of-
fice of the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General (Nov. 18, 2019), 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/db191118.doc.htm (“[The Secretary-General’s] position 
on the situation [in Xinjiang] is that there needs to be full respect for the unity and territorial 
integrity of China, condemnation of terrorist attacks, as no cause or grievances can justify 
them.”). 
 168 The Costs of International Advocacy, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 5, 2017), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/09/05/costs-international-advocacy/chinas-interference-
united-nations-human-rights. 
 169 Courtney J. Fung, Is China’s Influence at the United Nations all it’s Cracked Up to 
Be?, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/ 
10/07/is-chinas-influence-united-nations-all-that-its-cracked-up-be/. 
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China’s position in the U.N. has allowed it to use this growing support to legiti-
mize its views despite the State’s blatant disregard for the foundational human 
rights principles of the U.N. 
 
ii. Current International Conventions and Legal Instruments Relating 
to Protection of Data Rights and Accountability of Corporations 
Are Insufficient in Deterring Human Rights Violations by China 
and Chinese Companies 
 
China has signed but not ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights (ICCPR),170 which obligates State parties to ensure equal rights for 
all individuals “without distinction of any kind.”171 The ICCPR prohibits parties 
who are acting “[i]n time of public emergency” to discriminate against individ-
uals solely on the ground of certain statuses, including religion.172 Thus, if China 
were a party to the ICCPR, the surveillance mechanisms deployed by the Chinese 
State against the Uyghur Muslim population of Xinjiang would violate China’s 
obligations under the convention. China’s justifications national security justifi-
cations would not avoid violation, as Chinese corporations detain Uyghur Mus-
lims based on the presence of religious imagery and messages on their social 
networks.173 
China has neither signed nor ratified the 1976 Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR,174 which allows parties to bring claims to the Human Rights Committee 
set up by the Covenant.175 However, even under the Protocol, communications 
to the Committee are only admissible when they communicate a violation of the 
 
 170 Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH 
COMM’R (Feb. 9, 2021), https://indicators.ohchr.org/ (click on the “Select a treaty” dropdown 
menu and select “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”). 
 171 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171. 
 172 Id. at art. 4, ¶ 1. 
 173 See Darren Byler, How Technology Liberated China’s Uighur Minority–and then 
Trapped Them, QUARTZ (Oct. 1, 2019), https://qz.com/1719581/technology-liberated-chinas-
uighur-minority-and-then-trapped-them/ (explaining that Chinese authorities have “mapped 
out [a] person’s social network and history of Islamic practice, both in their local community 
and online,” in assessing security threats). 
 174 Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, supra note 170 (click on the “Select a 
treaty” dropdown menu and select “Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights”). 
 175 See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 
2, 5, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (allowing parties to overcome domestic remedy exhaus-
tion requirements “where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged”). 
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ICCPR by the State, not violation by a private party such as a private company.176 
However, the Committee has interpreted the ICCPR as requiring States to regu-
late and adjudicate private corporate acts in order to protect against abuse.177 
Thus, the Human Rights Committee accepts communications where the State has 
“failed to take steps to prevent, investigate, punish or redress wrongdoing by 
private actors, including business enterprises.”178 
In the case of Xinjiang, were China party to the ICCPR and its Optional Pro-
tocol, communications from repressed minority groups to the Human Rights 
Committee would be admissible, given that the Chinese State not only forces 
Chinese companies to comply with its abusive policies but also places Chinese 
Communist Party officials within the management structures of rising Chinese 
companies.179 Furthermore, the Human Rights Committee can hear communica-
tions under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR regarding violations of the 
ICCPR not only in the territory of a State party, but also regarding abuses against 
individuals outside the State’s territory.180 However, the Committee has not ex-
plicitly addressed these situations where a corporation acts on the State’s behalf 
outside the national territory of the State in question.181 
While the above provisions of the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR provide a route to holding private corporations accountable for human 
rights violations, China has indicated that its ratification of the ICCPR depends 
on “whether relevant conditions in China are in place.”182 Given that China 
signed the ICCPR in 1998, NGOs have called into question when these “relevant 
conditions” would be “in place.”183 Thus, so long as the ICCPR would allow the 
Human Rights Committee to investigate human rights violations committed by 
corporate actors influenced by a State, it remains highly unlikely that China will 
ratify the ICCPR. Regardless, given that China repeatedly advocates for limiting 
 
 176 John G. Ruggie (Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises), State Responsibilities to Regulate and Adjudicate Corporate 
Activities Under the United Nations’ Core Human Rights Treaties, 4 (June 2007). 
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 179 See Freedom in the World 2019: China, supra note 69. But see State Responsibilities 
to Regulate and Adjudicate Corporate Activities under the United Nations’ Core Human 
Rights Treaties, supra note 176, p. 54, ¶ 179 (“It is unclear under which conditions the HRC 
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ered to engage directly the responsibility of the State because it acts under the State’s direction, 
control or instructions.”). 
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United Nations’ Core Human Rights Treaties, supra note 176, ¶ 147, at 46. 
 181 Id. ¶ 155, at 48. 
 182 Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review of China in its Thirty-
First Session Addendum, supra note 165, ¶ 28.5. 
 183 See Sophie Richardson, Inconvenient Truths at China’s UN Rights Review, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (Mar. 13, 2019, 5:28 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/13/inconvenient-
truths-chinas-un-rights-review. 
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interpretations of human rights law to accommodate national security and sover-
eignty concerns,184 the Chinese State would likely provide bad faith arguments 
to skirt its obligations under the ICCPR even if it were a party. 
While a few multilateral legal instruments exist that effectively ensure the pro-
tection of user data from digital surveillance, these international legal obligations 
cannot currently hold Chinese tech and social media corporations liable for aid-
ing the Chinese State in committing the human rights violations in Xinjiang. The 
GDPR does have extraterritorial application outside of the EU to organizations 
that either offer goods and services to people in the EU or monitor the behavior 
of individuals in the EU.185 Specifically, if a corporation uses web tools that track 
cookies or IP addresses of those who visit the corporation’s website from EU 
countries, then that corporation falls under the scope of the GDPR.186 However, 
those involved in administering the GDPR have questioned how this extraterri-
torial reach based on monitoring would actually be enforced.187 Furthermore, 
even under the GDPR a member state may limit the data rights of individuals by 
domestic legislative measure when necessary to safeguard national security or 
other crucial state interests.188 
While both the GDPR and the the Chinese Cybersecurity Law (CSL) have 
similar conceptions of what constitutes “personal data,”189 the CSL focuses heav-
ily on tying the ideas of cybersecurity and data protection together.190 Given 
China’s aforementioned justifications for the surveillance and abuse of the Uy-
ghur people in Xinjiang relating to national security concerns and anti-terrorism 
initiatives, China’s promotion of data protection in the CSL rings hollow. 
The SCO’s approach to promoting strong cybersecurity mechanisms that en-
sure political stability, as previously discussed, reflect China’s view that national 
political and security interests trump equal treatment of individuals regardless of 
 
 184 Abbas Faiz, China is Building a Global Coalition of Human Rights Violators to Defend 
its Record in Xinjiang – What is its Endgame?, CONVERSATION (July 18, 2019, 9:05 AM), 
https://theconversation.com/china-is-building-a-global-coalition-of-human-rights-violators-
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 185 Ben Wolford, Does the GDPR Apply to Companies Outside of the EU?, GDPR.EU, 
https://gdpr.eu/companies-outside-of-europe/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2019). 
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 188 See Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 95, at art. 23 (restrictions must “respect[] 
the essence of the fundamental rights and freedoms and is a necessary and proportionate meas-
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 189 See Galaad Delval & Zhong Lin, GDPR Matchup: China’s Cybersecurity Law, INT’L 
ASSOC. OF PRIV. PRO. (June 28, 2017), https://iapp.org/news/a/gdpr-matchup-chinas-cyberse-
curity-law/ (comparing the definition of personal data in Article 4.1 of the GDPR with the 
definition of personal information given in Article 76.5 of the CSL). 
 190 Id. 
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their religious affiliation. The State parties to the SCO submitted a letter to the 
U.N. General Assembly in 2015, proposing an International Code of Conduct for 
application of “new information and communication technologies.”191 The pro-
posal promotes recognition that “the rights of an individual in the offline envi-
ronment must also be protected in the online environment,” and then references 
Article 19 of the ICCPR,192 which concerns the freedom of expression.193 Both 
Article 19 and SCO’s proposal to the U.N. assert that the freedom of expression 
may be curtailed “[f]or the protection of national security or of public order.”194 
Nevertheless, China is not a party to the ICCPR,195 and thus its participation in 
endorsing that portion of the 2015 proposed Code of Conduct appears to be in 
bad faith. 
Additionally, the 2015 proposed Code of Conduct emphasizes a State’s “right 
to independent control of information and communications technology 
goods.”196 This reflects China’s intensive regulation of its domestic tech compa-
nies, specifically its control over what information Chinese platforms should 
censor or what digital materials are targeted for surveillance by the Chinese State. 
Given the Chinese State’s heavy regulation of its domestic corporate actors in 
the tech and social media industries and the continued drive of the Communist 
Party’s leadership to suppress political dissent and cement regime stability, it 
seems highly unlikely that the China would currently become a party to an in-
strument such as the GDPR. 
The U.N. Human Rights Council contains a working group that has been de-
veloping an international convention “to regulate, in international human rights 
law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enter-
prises.”197 China specifically voted in favor of establishing the working group.198 
 
 191 Permanent Reps. of China, Kaz., Kyrg., Russ., Taj. & Uzb., Letter dated Jan. 9, 2015 
from the Permanent Representatives of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federa-
tion, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/69/723 
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The draft report of this legally binding instrument states that its regulation would 
apply to all business activities, “including but not limited to transnational corpo-
rations and other business enterprises that undertake business activities of a trans-
national nature.”199 Article 5 of the proposed instrument would oblige member 
States to ensure that their domestic laws require all persons conducting business 
activities to respect human rights and prevent human rights violations and 
abuses.200 Furthermore, the draft instrument defines “[b]usiness activities” as 
“including but not limited to productive or commercial activity . . . including ac-
tivities undertaken by electronic means.”201 However, the definition of “[h]uman 
rights violation or abuse” under Article 1 of the instrument does not present an 
exhaustive list202 and therefore the exact situations where corporations would be 
held liable under the instrument remains unclear. Thus, even under the draft in-
strument it remains uncertain to what extent Chinese corporations could be held 
liable for the surveillance and censoring mechanisms in Xinjiang. 
Even if China was potentially liable, there’s a question as to whether China 
would become party to such a multilateral legal instrument in the first place. Ar-
ticle 12 of the proposed instrument allows defendants to refuse recognition and 
enforcement by a court with jurisdiction after a claim has been brought “where 
the judgment is manifestly contrary to the [public order] of the Party in which its 
recognition is sought.”203 The draft also affirms that State obligations under the 
proposed instrument should be carried out “in a manner consistent with, and fully 
respecting, the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States 
and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States.”204 Thus, even 
if China became a party to this instrument, it likely would continue to shield its 
corporations from international liability on the grounds of sovereignty and non-
intervention in domestic affairs. 
 
Rica, Gabon, Kuwait, Maldives, Mexico, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, United Arab Emir-
ates[.]”). 
 199 U.N. Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Grp. on Transnat’l Corps. & Other Bus. 
Enters. with Respect to Hum. Rts., Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International 
Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enter-
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 203 Id. at art. 12(9)(c). 
 204 Id. at art. 14(1). 
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As evidenced above, existing and developing multilateral legal instruments 
relating to corporate accountability for human rights violations ineffectively en-
sure liability for those Chinese corporate actors that have aided the Chinese State 
in monitoring and detaining Uyghurs in Xinjiang on the basis of their religious 
and ethnic affiliations. The primacy of non-interference in domestic matters ech-
oes in the majority of multilateral instruments that could apply to this situation, 
and China has increasingly cultivated a consensus of States that support the pri-
macy of sovereignty over the protection of human rights and individual privacy. 
 
B. Additional Considerations in Developing a Consensus on International 
Standards for Corporate Liability and Human Rights Instruments that 
Reach Corporate Actors Who Are Shielded by Powerful States 
 
China’s soft power on the international stage has severely hampered interna-
tional consensus against China’s use of domestic corporate actors to monitor the 
Xinjiang region and to persecute minority groups in the region. As previously 
discussed, various States have begun implementing their own versions of the 
Global Magnitsky Act, the transnational law that holds private individuals and 
corporations accountable for human rights violations.205 While that Act in its 
current form can only prevent transactions between domestic and foreign com-
panies,206 should enough States adopt similar provisions they could increasingly 
restrict the ability of Chinese companies involved in the abuses in Xinjiang from 
conducting business outside of China. These types of measures would most ef-
fectively pressure those Chinese companies with major markets outside of China, 
such as Hikvision Digital Technology and Zhejiang Dahua Technology.207 Even 
then, many Chinese firms are partially—or fully—controlled by Chinese State 
actors, such as the China Electronics Technology Corporation.208 Some argue 
that sanctions by the United States have not driven China towards reforming its 
policies, but rather encourage the Chinese State to become more involved in 
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 207 See Olivia Carville & Jeremy Kahn, China’s Hikvision Has Probably Filmed You, 
BLOOMBERG (May 24, 2019, 10:25 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-
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 208 See Buckley & Mozur, supra note 5 (“Hikvision is a major manufacturer of video sur-
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growing the domestic Chinese tech market.209 Thus, the pressure from these 
Magnitsky-type sections would not necessarily deter these types of firms as they 
might deter entirely-private firms. 
Another issue with Magnitsky-type legal regimes is that the imposition of 
sanctions tend to harm the profits of domestic companies from the imposing 
State.210 Additionally, Chinese firms can circumvent sanctions implemented un-
der laws such as the Global Magnitsky Act by instead buying products from 
States that have not yet imposed similar laws.211 Thus, while these types of sanc-
tions may harm Chinese tech firms who wish to do business outside of China, 
they only do so to the extent that numerous States have imposed similar laws that 
effectively block a specific market for Chinese firms. 
Given that organizations such as the EU have avoided concrete measures 
against China and Chinese firms for the human rights abuses in Xinjiang,212 
States must take initiative to craft domestic laws that specifically target these 
Chinese firms. However, States have been hesitant to pressure domestic compa-
nies from engaging in business in Xinjiang outside of formal sanction regimes.213 
Global marketplaces have additionally complicated efforts to harm the profits of 
Chinese tech companies that have participated in the abuses in Xinjiang, as Chi-
nese companies can rely on complex chains of suppliers and vendors to avoid 
direct transactions that would violate sanction regimes.214 Thus, States continue 
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to face a variety of challenges related to the complexity of contemporary global 
markets, as well as the Chinese State’s heavy drive to grow its domestic tech 
industry, in formulating their own sanctions regimes to address the human rights 
violations in Xinjiang. 
Rapid technological advancement in the past two centuries further compli-
cates the situation, as it has debatably left international law to catch up to these 
trends after serious international issues have emerged. Specifically, in the case 
of Xinjiang, it appears that very few international legal instruments effectively 
reach the digital surveillance and complex censorship tactics employed by Chi-
nese corporations in furtherance of the Chinese Communist Party’s goals. The 
emergence of social media in the twenty-first century specifically has called into 
question the state-centric approach to international law, as individuals worldwide 
have increasingly pushed for the right to express themselves and to maintain data 





The situation in Xinjiang presents unique challenges to those international ac-
tors who seek to hold Chinese tech corporations accountable for their complicity 
and active aid in the human rights abuses against the Uyghur people by the Chi-
nese State. These challenges cumulatively prevent expedited multilateral efforts 
to stop the abuses in Xinjiang, and instead force States to work from the ground 
up to form a consensus against the actions of these Chinese corporations. Only 
through building a strong consensus, facilitated through passing domestic laws 
and discussions with NGOs and important multinational corporations in the tech 
industry, can States effectively hold these Chinese corporations accountable for 
their role in the human rights abuses in Xinjiang. 
First, China’s immense influence on the global stage and role within the U.N. 
prevents meaningful inquiries into the violation of human rights in Xinjiang. 
China can formally block many forms of action through its position on the U.N. 
Security Council and through its participation in human rights-oriented U.N. 
bodies. Additionally, China’s soft power, which China utilizes through foreign 
investment in and the sharing of surveillance technology with other authoritarian 
regimes, have resulted in a pushback against human rights protectors that frames 
China’s Xinjiang abuses in terms of territorial sovereignty and the right to con-
duct internal affairs. States that seek to form consensus at the U.N. level against 
the surveillance and detention regime in Xinjiang must continue to push for the 
promotion of human rights over potential economic gain and political interests. 
Second, existing multilateral legal instruments relating to corporate accounta-
bility and data protection cannot adequately address the conduct of the Chinese 
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tech firms that participate in the ongoing abuses in Xinjiang. China is not a party 
to many major multilateral regimes that would entail obligations to respect the 
rights of the Uyghur people, such as the ICCPR. Furthermore, international law, 
particularly in the form of customary international law, has not yet caught up to 
rapid development of technology in the twenty-first century and the recent emer-
gence of social media as a major form of communication for societies across the 
globe. While some organizations, such as the EU, have developed their own reg-
ulatory regimes that aim to protect user data and ensure corporate accountability, 
others such as the SCO have developed competing conceptions of “data privacy” 
that make individual rights subordinate to the government’s political interests. 
Lastly, the interconnectedness of contemporary global markets has incentiv-
ized companies to continue to engage with Chinese tech firms in Xinjiang and 
with the Chinese market on the whole. China’s rapidly developing domestic tech 
industry has resulted in an export of Chinese tech worldwide, and multinational 
corporations are incentivized to participate in the Chinese market due to its sheer 
size. Without broad multilateral efforts to boycott products from these Chinese 
tech companies and to refrain from engaging in the Chinese market, sanctions on 
the individual State level often end up harming that State’s own markets, as Chi-
nese companies can simply find another trade partner that lacks these formal 
sanctions. 
Given these challenges, I believe effective action against the Chinese tech 
firms that facilitate the human rights abuses in Xinjiang starts at the individual 
level. States must pass their own domestic laws that specifically criminalize and 
punish foreign corporations for the types of conduct that have led to the human 
rights abuses in Xinjiang. Specifically, States must promote the protection of the 
freedom of expression and data privacy over economic gain and should restrict 
trade with foreign corporations to the extent that these corporations do not re-
spect these individual rights. 
Domestic laws such as the Global Magnitsky Act address human rights abuses 
by corporate actors to some extent, but these laws are not yet widely adopted. 
Corporations in the tech industry, including those that host social media plat-
forms, must themselves develop internal codes of conduct that obligate corporate 
management to protect human rights over making a profit off human rights 
abuses. States cannot work at the U.N. level alone to develop these instruments, 
as China’s position on the Security Council and ability to garner support from 
authoritarian regimes prevents meaningful consensus within U.N. bodies that 
could push for accountability. States should continue to engage in discussions 
with NGOs and tech corporations as to how to best protect human rights while 
conducting foreign businesses and should encourage other States to join in on 
these discussions. 
States must actively and harshly rebuke the common “national security” and 
“anti-terrorism” justifications for these abuses as forwarded by authoritarian 
States such as China. While States should show restraint in directing the conduct 
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of its own domestic corporate actors in response to the crisis in Xinjiang, they 
should frame policies and sanction regimes against Chinese tech corporations 
involved in Xinjiang in terms of their own human rights and international legal 
obligations. Through developing a strong consensus against the corporate abuses 
in Xinjiang, States can not only more effectively negotiate for multilateral legal 
instruments that address corporate accountability for human rights abuses, but 
also may encourage the development of customary international law over time 
that addresses the type of conduct in question.   
 
